Western New England Law Review
Volume 9 9 (1987)
Issue 1

Article 6

1-1-1987

INFORMED CONSENT IN OBSTETRICS:
SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS
Nancy K. Rhoden

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Nancy K. Rhoden, INFORMED CONSENT IN OBSTETRICS: SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS, 9 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 67 (1987),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol9/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

INFORMED CONSENT IN OBSTETRICS: SOME
SPECIAL PROBLEMS
NANCY

K.

RHODEN·

INTRODUCTION

As Professor Katz's astute analysis has shown us, the real world
of medical decisionmaking bears little resemblance to lofty judicial
language about informed consent. l Medical authority, professional so
cialization, doctors' intense yet often unrecognized psychological
motivations, and even judges' implicit acceptance of the belief that
"doctor knows best," are some of the invisible yet virtually invincible
barriers to truly shared decisionmaking. In analyzing the consent pro
cess for the first heart transplant, Professor Katz also illustrates why
certain areas of medicine, such as catastrophic illness, may raise par
ticular difficulties in achieving informed consent. In this essay I will
suggest that obstetrics is another area in which the consent process is
peculiarly problematic.
For the last year, I have had the opportunity to observe decision
making in obstetrics at several hospitals. My primary interest has
been maternal-fetal conflicts--cases where, for example, a Cesarean is
necessary for the fetus' life or health but the woman refuses surgery,
often on religious grounds. Increasingly, these extreme conflicts are
resolved by courts, rather than by patients or physicians. But in the
course of observing obstetrical decisionmaking, I have noticed dis
turbing patterns in some of the far more common cases where there is
little or no apparent conflict. The problems here are subtler, I believe,
but no less real. The problems stem in part from physicians' tradi
tional and strongly ingrained responses to situations of uncertainty.
Part I of this article describes two paradigmatic decision strate
gies in obstetrics, one which permeates routine obstetrical care, the
• Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University, College of Law; B.A., Oberlin
College, 1974; J.D., New York University, 1977. I wish to thank John Arras, Alan Fleisch
man, Jay Katz, and Ruth Macklin for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
This research was made possible by the hospitality of Dr. Fleischman and the Albert Ein
stein College of Medicine and by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities
and the National Science Foundation.
\. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
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other which comes into play only when an obstetrical tragedy is in the
making. The problem is not that these strategies exist, but that physi
cians' typical approach to uncertainty or to a crisis may be perceived
not as one strategy among several, but as the only legitimate approach.
Patients see the physician's recommendation as the best or only hope
for the baby, and this viewpoint virtually guarantees acceptance of
that recommendation, except in cases of exceedingly firm beliefs on
the part of the mother.
Part II demonstrates how the almost inevitable nature of consent
in obstetrics may mask a number of controversial value judgments re
garding the relative importance of the woman's concerns versus the
fetus' well-being. Such judgments are inevitable given the nature of
obstetrics, where one patient resides silent and hidden within another.
But the potential for conflict about judgments is intensifying as bur
geoning technology lets doctors visualize and assess the once inaccessi
ble fetus. As cases in which courts have ordered women to submit to
Cesareans illustrate, in obstetrics, unlike other areas of medicine, there
is increasing conflict over whether a competent patient should have
the right to refuse needed medical procedures.
In Part III, I ask how this incipient reallocation of power from
patient to physician may affect obstetrical decisionmaking. Although
I suggest how Professor Katz's theories could potentially improve ob
stetrical decisionmaking, my sense is nonetheless that the prognosis
for shared decisionmaking in obstetrics is grim.

I.

Two

OBSTETRICAL PARADIGMS

Obstetrical decisionmaking is, of course, often quite complex. At
the risk of serious oversimplification, I will describe two prototypical
decision strategies in obstetrics. The first is the standard American
approach to routine obstetrical care. This is to focus on the worst
possible outcome-fetal mortality or morbidity-and take aggressive
preventive measures, even though the outcome is rather unlikely and
the preventive measures have certain drawbacks of their own. This
strategy is called the "maximin" strategy in obstetrics. 2 Certain re
sults of this strategy, i.e., the "over-medicalization" of childbirth and
the use of arguably unnecessary interventions, have been the impetus
for the "natural childbirth" critique of modern American obstetrics. 3
2. Brody & Thompson, The Maximin Strategy in Obstetrics, 12 J. FAM. PRAC. 977
(1981).
3. For a sampling of the large and growing body of literature criticizing the medical
interventionism prevalent in American obstetrics, see Y. BRACKBILL, J. RICE & D.
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The second approach has received far less attention because it is
generally limited to crisis situations. It is simply the quite understand
able tendency to intervene aggressively in any crisis where the fetus is
imperiled, even though the chances of success, in terms of the infant's
intact survival, are exceedingly low. The intervention here, normally a
Cesarean, is sometimes troubling, not in the course that is chosen, but
because of how that course is chosen.
I should emphasize that the intent of this article is not to criticize
either the maximin strategy or what might be called the "only hope"
approach. Many, perhaps even most, women would choose these
strategies if given a choice. Rather, my criticism is that women are
not given the choice, because doctors' responses to situations of uncer
tainty or crisis in obstetrics are so deeply ingrained, so multiply moti
vated, and so persuasive to pregnant women that for most women,
rejecting medical recommendations is virtually unthinkable.
A.

The Maximin Strategy in Obstetrics

Uncertainty permeates modern medicine. If doctors waited for
certainty to act, they might never do anything at all. But acting under
uncertainty requires some sort of strategy for making decisions with
out all the desirable information. Such strategies, whether conscious
or unconscious, explicit or implicit, incorporate an attitude toward
risk. Attitudes toward risk may vary widely, from, for example, the
risk-averse fellow who carries an umbrella every day of the year to his
devil-may-care counterpart who carries one only when he sees that it is
pouring. The latter type person is unlikely to make a good doctor:
after all, who wants a doctor who cavalierly foregoes performing tests
for serious disease on the optimistic assumption that your strange
symptoms will go away.
Physicians in general come much closer to carrying umbrellas
every day. This is quite understandable. The maximin strategy, a
common, albeit often unarticulated medical strategy, has been de
scribed as follows: "choosing the alternative that makes the best of the
worst possible outcome, regardless of the probability that that outYOUNG, BIRTHTRAP: THE LEGAL Low-DOWN ON HIGH-TECH OBSTETRICS (1984); G.
CASSIDy-BRINN, F. HORNSTEIN & C. DOWNER, WOMEN-CENTERED PREGNANCY AND
BIRTH (1984); M. EDWARDS & M. WALDORF, RECLAIMING BIRTH: HISTORY AND HER
OINES OF AMERICAN CHILDBIRTH REFORM (1984); B. ROTHMAN, GIVING BIRTH: AL
TERNATIVES IN CHILDBIRTH (1982); THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK
COLLECTIVE, THE NEW OUR BODIES, OURSELVES (\984); CHILDBIRTH: ALTERNATIVES
TO MEDICAL CONTROL
JONES, July 1980, at 28.

(S. Romalis ed. 1981); Corea, The Cesarean Epidemic, MOTHER
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come will occur."4 This conservative, risk averse approach is most ap
propriate when the level of uncertainty is high and the worst potential
outcome extremely bad. This is often the situation in medicine, and
certainly is a feature of obstetrical decisionmaking, where the fetus'
status cannot be assessed by normal means given its internal location,
where unexpected disasters can occur throughout pregnancy and de
livery, and where the worst possible outcomes-maternal or neonatal
death-are very bad indeed. Hence obstetricians typically take a vari
ety of preventive actions intended to forestall and/or detect potential
problems.
Numerous examples of these preventive actions are available. The
supine position most women are placed in in hospital deliveries facili
tates vaginal examinations, allows episiotomy (a surgical cutting of the
skin around the perineum to increase the opening for birth), 5 and al
lows for electronic fetal monitoring to assess the fetus' response to la
bor. Amniotomy (rupturing the membranes) helps speed labor, a
result considered valuable inasmuch as a very slow labor is believed to
be more hazardous for the fetus. 6 Amniotomy is also necessary for
internal fetal monitoring. Instructing the woman in labor not to eat or
drink, and instead giving her fluids intravenously, is done in case an
emergency Cesarean and general anesthesia are needed. Using elec
tronic fetal monitoring on all women in labor is yet another example
of maximin reasoning. While the value of fetal monitoring is unques
tioned in high risk deliveries, fetal distress is not very common in low
risk pregnancies: one study has calculated that in these cases, moni
toring could at best save 3 out of 1000 babies. 7
Although each of these preventive actions may be justified, critics
charge that interventions taken to forestall and/or detect problems
have significant and detrimental effects of their own. Specifically, they
claim that many such interventions interfere in the delivery process in
a way that increases the chances of difficulties and hence make subse
quent, and more far-reaching, interventions more likely. Again, there
are multiple examples. At the most basic level, critics allege that the
supine position itself slows labor and renders delivery more difficult:
4. Brody & Thompson, supra note 2, at 977.
5. After birth, the episiotomy must be sutured. Y. BRACKBILL, J. RICE & D.
YOUNG, supra note 3, at 14.
6. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH: RE
PORT OF A CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE 342 (1981) [hereinafter CESAREAN
CHILDBIRTH] (describing correlation between protracted labor and increased perinatal
mortality and morbidity).
7. Neutra, Rienberg & Griedman, The Effect 0/ Fetal Monitoring on Neonatal Death
Rates, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 325 (1978).
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as one doctor has put it, "Except for being hanged by the feet, the
supine position is the worst conceivable position for labor and deliv
ery."8 Its also been suggested that the supine position renders tears
more likely, thus making preventive episiotomy more necessary.9
Amniotomy, although again not a particularly significant or risky in
tervention, does increase the risk of infection as labor continues. JO Be
cause of this risk, women may not be allowed to labor as long with
ruptured membranes as without. I I If labor appears slow, doctors may
administer oxytocin to speed it up. Oxytocin, however, can cause un
usually intense contractions that reduce fetal oxygen supply and cause
fetal distress. 12 Oxytocin administration therefore necessitates elec
tronic monitoring. But because oxytocin causes fetal distress in some
cases, this series of interventions can itself lead to a Cesarean. Alter
natively, if oxytocin is stopped in an attempt to alleviate the oxytocin
induced distress, labor may stop as well, again necessitating surgical
delivery.
Finally, routine use of electronic monitoring entails a high
number of false positives-cases in which an abnormal or seemingly
abnormal fetal heart rate pattern is not predictive, in actuality, of fetal
distress. Even with additional tests to try to rule out false positives,
researchers estimate that false positive rates approach forty-four per
cent. 13 Doctors may differ significantly in their interpretations of fetal
heart rate patterns and their responses to potentially ominous pat
terns.14 But the caution instilled by obstetrical training, the prevailing
maximin strategy, and the fear of legal liability for a bad outcome
make the response of performing a Cesarean for even a questionable
pattern very appealing. Thus monitoring is another intervention that
8. Y. BRACKBILL, 1. RICE & D. YOUNG, supra note 3, at 12.
9. Id. at 13.
10. G. CASSIDy-BRINN, F. HORNSTEIN & C. DOWNER, supra note 3, at 139; Brody
& Thompson, supra note 2, at 980. It is often argued that the cause of the increased infec
tion risk is the frequent vaginal exams conducted in hospitals, and that without exams labor
could continue much longer after rupture o(meinbranes. See Corea, supra note 3, at 30.
II. G. CASSIDy-BRINN, F. HORNSTEIN & C. DOWNER, supra note 3, at 139.
12. Y. BRACKBILL, 1. RICE & D. YOUNG, supra note 3, at 9. In fact, one national
expert on fetal monitoring has stated: that the most frequent cause of late decelerations in
term labors in the United States must be hypercontractility triggered by the misuses of
oxytocic substances. L. CIBILS, ELECTRONIC FETAL-MATERNAL MONITORING:
ANTEPARTUM, INTRAPARTUM 229-36 (1981).
13. Banta & Thacker, Assessing the Costs and Benefits ofElectronic Fetal Monitoring,
34 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. SURV. 627, 629 (1979).
14. Cohen, Klapholz & Thomas, Electronic Fetal Monitoring and Clinical Practices,
2 MED. DECISION MAKING 79, 84 (1982) (describing variation in experts' interpretations
of abnormal monitor patterns and recommendations for action).
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may increase the chances of Cesarean delivery-the last link in the
obstetrical intervention chain.
The maximin strategy is a perfectly legitimate strategy for choice
under uncertainty. It is intended to optimize fetal outcome, and many
pregnant women would choose this approach over all others were al
ternative decision strategies offered to them. The problem in obstetri
cal decisionmaking is that they are not. Instead, the maximin strategy
is almost synonymous with standard and accepted obstetrical practice.
Of course, well-educated women with financial means can seek out
private physicians who are less interventionist than others, or they can
go to alternative birthing centers. But the general obstetrical popula
tion is seldom presented with a choice of approaches to obstetrical
care.
Professor Katz describes how doctors are loathe to reveal their
uncertainty to patients even when they are fully aware of such uncer
tainty. Needless to say, doctors are unlikely to tell obstetrical patients
that: (a) they are acting with uncertainty; (b) there are multiple deci
sion strategies under uncertainty, ranging from high risk averse ones
to less risk averse ones; (c) they, as obstetricians, prefer a strategy that
focuses on fetal risk and takes aggressive action to prevent it; and/or
(d) this strategy tends to increase maternal risk by increasing the
chances of surgical delivery. It is almost impossible to imagine this
sort of physician/patient dialogue. Indeed, the maximin strategy is so
much a part of the obstetrical profession's "collective unconscious"
that the doctor is as unlikely to describe this as one strategy among
many as the trial lawyer who long since accepted the adversarial sys
tem as the best and only system of justice is to question the system's
real value.
B.

The Only Hope Approach

The second strategy applies only when the fetus is in great peril.
Much as doctors using the maximin strategy basically discount the
probability of the bad outcome materializing, physicians faced with an
obstetrical crisis tend to intervene aggressively to give the baby its last
or only hope, even in cases where the chances of success are extremely
low. I have participated in retroactive discussions of a number of
cases where the issue was whether doctors should have recommended,
as they always did, and even urged Cesarean delivery given the fetus'
slim chances of intact survival. I will first describe the most common
situation where this obstetrical strategy comes into play, and then sev
eral variations based on cases or composites of cases that I have seen.
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The issue of Cesarean delivery arises when a woman comes to the
hospital in premature labor that cannot be stopped, or when she has a
medical condition in late pregnancy that necessitates premature deliv
ery. Premature fetuses may be endangered by the labor process, and
may do better if delivered surgically.ls When harm from vaginal de
livery is feared, and the baby is very likely to survive intact if delivered
by Cesarean-i.e., the pregnancy has progressed beyond the twenty
eighth week and there are no complicating factors, then recom
mending Cesarean delivery to give the baby its best chance is fairly
uncontroversial. But as gestation length decreases, a dilemma arises.
Babies born after twenty-four weeks of gestation are at the thresh
old of viability. 16 A few infants born this early will thrive. Others will
survive, but with lingering neurological deficits. Many more will die,
though perhaps after harrowing weeks or months in the neonatal in
tensive care unit. Chances of survival, and of intact survival, increase
with every week of gestation from weeks twenty-four to twenty-eight,
after which time about eighty percent of infants survive. 17 There is,
however, no question that an infant born even at week twenty-eight
will require months in the intensive care unit, and will face an in
creased risk of death or disability. Thus these cases entail radical un
certainty about the baby's prospects, but certainty as to the need for
lengthy, intensive care.
Compounding this is the fact that while Cesarean section is at any
time a more hazardous mode of delivery for the woman than vaginal
delivery,18 early in pregnancy it is more hazardous still. Because of
the underdevelopment of the lower segment of the uterus until some
time after about the thirtieth week, an early Cesarean cannot be the
standard low transverse kind, but must be a classical vertical inci
sion. 19 This is a more serious operation, and one that definitely ren
ders Cesarean delivery necessary for any subsequent births.20 Thus
15. In general, the more immature the fetus, the greater the risks from labor and
delivery. J. PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD & N. GANT, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 756 (17th
ed. 1985).
16. See id. at 143 (fetuses born at 24th week almost always die shortly after birth).
17. See P. BUDETII, P. McMANUS, N. BARRAND & L. HEINER, THE IMPLICA
TIONS OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: THE COST AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE 32 (1981) (greater than 80% survival
rate for infants between 1000 grams, the mean weight at 28 weeks, and 1500 grams).
18. Figures vary, but a general estimate is that Cesarean birth carries 2-4 times the
risk of mortality as vaginal birth. CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH, supra note 6, at 16.
19. Interview with Dr. Joanna Shulman, Assistant Professor of Obstetrics and Gyne
cology, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, in New York City (Jan. 24, 1986) [hereinafter
Shulman interview].
20. Id.
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another feature of these cases is increased maternal risk. In this in
stance, the decision to be made is whether the infant's chances of in
tact survival warrant this increased maternal risk.
Women faced with these dilemmas most often desperately want a
child. Hence, even if the chances for intact survival are slim, they can
be readily persuaded to go for the long shot. In some cases, it may be
highly questionable whether the infant's chances really warrant ag
gressive intervention. But even in these cases, it is extremely hard for
physicians to stand by and not perform surgery if there is any hope at
all, even the slimmest thread.
A case in which a woman came to the hospital in her thirty-first
week reporting no fetal movement for two to three days illustrated this
latter reality. Ultrasound examination showed quite significant
growth retardation in the fetus, with its size appearing to be consistent
with twenty-seven to twenty-eight weeks gestation. Because of the in
trauterine growth retardation, her fetus' chances were not nearly as
good as the chances of a fetus at thirty-one weeks with normal size for
its gestation age. Moreover, two days of no discernible fetal movement
were ominous signs, and electronic fetal monitoring confirmed that the
fetus was in extreme distress. In fact, physicians classified the fetus'
heart pattern as "early terminal," indicating a strong probability of
either early death or severe retardation if it survived.
The woman was not in labor, and fetal death was virtually inevi
table absent Cesarean delivery. She initially stated that she did not
want a Cesarean, which would have to be a classical one, because she
did not want to have a retarded child. Although physician opinion
was mixed, one of the doctors convinced the woman to have surgery,
stressing that it was her baby's only hope, and at one point implying
that with surgery her baby's chances were perhaps fifty percent. The
Cesarean was performed, and the baby was born weighing 735 grams.
For its gestational age, it should have weighed 1,000 to 1,400 grams.
The baby lived approximately forty~~ight hours. In subsequent discus
sions, various medical personnel questioned the influence exerted on
the woman and suggested that although it was very hard to estimate
the infant's chances of intact survival with all of its risk factors, they
were nowhere near fifty percent. Several female physicians and mid
wives stated that they would not have wanted a Cesarean under those
circumstances.
In that case, the woman involved expressed an opinion even
though she was talked into having surgery anyway. Often, however, a
woman may have no opportunity to say anything at all. For example,
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in another case, a pregnant woman came in at term reporting several
days of no fetal movement. Doctors initially tried to induce labor by
giving her pitocin. Electronic fetal monitoring, however, showed fetal
distress. A fetal scalp blood sampling indicated a pH of 7.02. A nor
mal pH level is between 7.2 and 7.25 while a pH of 7.02 shows severe
anoxia and one below 7.0, if sustained for long, is consistent with cel
lular death. 21 A second fetal scalp blood sample was done to confirm
the severity of the fetus' condition and it showed a pH of 6.8-a level
that is basically incompatible with life. At this point, the fetal heart
tracing was terminal. Doctors then told the woman that the only hope
for her baby's survival was an emergency Cesarean. They did not
present her with a choice about surgery, nor did they tell her how
unlikely intact survival was no matter what they did. The doctors per
formed the Cesarean, and the baby lived about fifteen hours.
Subsequent rounds again questioned the advisability of perform
ing a Cesarean in this case, or at least of performing it without explain
ing to the woman just how grave the situation was, despite the
obviously extreme time constraints. One of the obstetrical experts said
that with a pH of 6.8 only ten percent of babies will survive, with
about fifty percent of the survivors being normal. Of course, a
Cesarean would be perfectly appropriate if an informed mother wished
it, but this woman had no chance to make an informed decision. 22
The problem that these cases illustrate relates neither to actual
outcome, nor to the choice to intervene aggressively. Rather, the prob
lem is the near inevitability of this choice and the reasons that underlie
it. Most women would probably choose aggressive intervention when
there is any hope at all, and one certainly does not want doctors to
readily "write-off" imperiled fetuses. As with catastrophic illnesses,
when an extraordinary or even experimental treatment may be the
only hope, doctors' strong personal and professional inclination in ob
stetrical crises is to seize that slim chance. But at some point, as the
baby's chances decrease, intervention begins to seem less like a realis
tic effort to save and becomes more of a rescue fantasy, or an attempt
to vanquish the doctor's feelings of helplessness and fulfill a deeply
ingrained personal and professional need to do something. Doctors'
21. Physicians provided these figures in discussion of the cases, and the severity of
the pH level is confirmed by discussions in various texts. See, e.g., Haverkamp, A Con
trolled Trial of the Differential Effects of Intrapartum Fetal Monitoring, 134 AM. J. OB
STET. GYNECOL. 399,401 (1979) (pH of 7.20-7.25 problematic; below 7.20 an indication
for immediate action).
22. I should emphasize that cases such as these are standard: the only unusual fea
ture may be the subsequent ethical analysis.
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inclinations here may color how they present the chances to the wo
man. Moreover, even if they fully inform her of her baby's grim pros
pects, it is still true that surgery is the child's only chance, and that in
some cases, if the baby lives despite foregoing surgery, it could be
worse off than if the Cesarean had been performed. Some women may
nonetheless prefer almost inevitable fetal death to a strong possibility
that the baby will live but with severe retardation. Yet they may feel
enormous guilt at even thinking this, much less expressing it to a doc
tor who appears unreceptive. Doctors need only to suggest, "Don't
you want to do everything for your baby?" for the woman's questions
about surgery, prognosis, etc., to be submerged into the drive to give
her child its only chance for life. 23
Thus we have two prevalent, but largely implicit and unques
tioned, approaches to decisionmaking in obstetrics. Women are often
told nothing more than that a particular procedure is necessary for
their baby's health. Given the circumstances, it is no wonder that the
recommended procedure is almost always performed. Indeed, perhaps
what is surprising is that some women steadfastly refuse recommended
interventions. In the typical case where the woman consents, whether
readily, desperately, or reluctantly, a set of value judgments are often
obscured in the process. It is therefore worthwhile spelling out the
various value judgments implicit in both routine and crisis-oriented
obstetrical decisions, as well as briefly describing the emerging conflict
over who decides.
II.

OBSTETRICAL

VALVES

AND OBSTETRICAL RESPONSIBILITY

It is quite obvious that decisionmaking in obstetrics differs from

decisionmaking in other areas of medicine, in that only in obstetrics is
one patient within and dependent upon another. It has not been until
recent years, with the development of new techniques allowing the
doctor to visualize and assess the fetus' status, and the possibility of
taking various actions (e.g., monitoring, surgical delivery) solely for
the fetus' benefit, that the full implications of this dual patienthood
have started to emerge. 24 In the past, because nothing much could be
23. Dr. Joanna Shulman, among others, has emphasized doctors' enormous influ
ence, particularly when recommendations for intervention are expressed in this way. Shul
man interview, supra note 19.
24. There is a burgeoning literature on these potential conflicts, much of it analyzing
the potential impact of in utero fetal therapy. See, e.g., Barclay, McCormick, Sidbury,
Michejda & Hodgen, The Ethics ofIn Utero Surgery, 246 J. A.M.A. 1550 (1981); Fletcher,
Healing before Birth: An Ethical Dilemma, TECH. REV., Jan. 1984, at 27; Hubbard, Legal
and Policy Implications of Recent Advances in Prenatal Diagnosis and Fetal Therapy, 7
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done for the invisible and inaccessible fetus, the woman was, by de
fault, the primary focus of the physician treating the maternal/fetal
unit. Today, however, there is more of a gestalt at work in whether
one sees the woman as primary, or the fetus, or each at different times.
Electronic fetal monitoring, for example, makes the fetus the focus of
the delivery process: a common complaint is that the blips on the
monitor screen tend to displace attention from the laboring woman.
In a very real sense, the woman is a barrier which must be overcome in
order to assess fetal status. As technology improves medicine's ability
to "penetrate" this "maternal barrier," the possibility for value con
flicts in obstetrics concomitantly increases.
One potential value conflict that may permeate routine obstetrical
decision making arises from the juxtaposition of the medical maximin
strategy, which emphasizes fetal outcome, and an individual woman's
views about the importance of the birthing process. While many wo
men may share a desire to avoid any fetal risks at all costs, others may
reject much medical intervention because of religious views, desires for
a natural childbirth, or other reasons. Pregnant women, as the ones
who experience the process of pregnancy and childbirth, naturally
have a greater interest and concern about the process itself. Some doc
tors scoff at concerns about process. One researcher on the increasing
Cesarean rate reports repeatedly being asked by physicians: "'What's
so great about delivering from below [vaginally] anyway?' "25 Others
may recognize the legitimacy of these concerns, and be willing to let
them influence their mode of practice, but because it is the patient's
birth process, not the physician's, the obstetrician can never actually
share the concerns.
It is, of course, a truism that no doctor can fully embrace and
accept a patient's feelings-the fundamental isolation of an individual
in one's own SUbjectivity is inescapable. But the barriers to achieving
at least empathy are higher than usual in obstetrics, because of the
different ways to perceive the maternal/fetal unit. The maximin strat
egy, by focusing on the fetus, inclines its adherents to see the fetus as
figure and the woman as ground, at least metaphorically. Thus the
doctor might view the woman's concerns about process as trivial or
frivolous in comparison to the overriding goal of achieving optimal
fetal outcome, and the woman who senses this may find it harder to
express her concerns.
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 201 (1982); Ruddick & Wilcox, Operating on the Fetus, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Oct. 1982, at 10.
25. Corea, supra note 3, at 31 (quoting Dr. Helen Marieskind).
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The potential conflict between a physician's focus on fetal out
come and some women's concerns about the birthing process will be
intensified in the cases in which the woman believes outcome and pro
cess are not entirely separate. Doctors using a maximin strategy make
a strong dichotomy between process and outcome. A woman, how
ever, may believe that her baby will do better if she does not take
drugs, or walks around during labor (and thus is not continuously
monitored), or even if she gives birth in a more relaxed and intimate
home environment. Whether or not process ordinarily affects out
come, it will be at least somewhat more likely to do so if the woman
strongly believes it will: for example, monitoring can slow labor or
even cause decreased oxygen flow to the fetus if the woman exper
iences a great deal of anxiety about the monitor. 26 Because virtually
all maximin-type interventions are aimed at optimizing fetal outcome,
doctors may have good scientific reason to reject a woman's idea that a
more natural process will enhance outcome. But this may give too
little importance to the SUbjective force of the woman's beliefs.
Of course, the woman also is concerned about her outcome. Her
concern may encompass not only objectively devastating outcomes
such as death, disability, or loss of reproductive capacity, but also feel
ings about pain, bodily invasion, recovery time from giving birth
(which is greater with surgical than vaginal delivery), future Cesare
ans, and scarring. These concerns are similar to those of any medical
patient and again, while doctors can try to understand, they cannot
really know or adopt the patient's values. Here, however, her values
potentially can harm the fetus, at least if she strongly opposes medical
or surgical intervention. Thus the physician may be more apt to dis
count them or deem them illegitimate.
The potential conflicts discussed thus far have involved the max
imin strategy's focus on the fetus versus the woman's incorporation of
concerns for her health, her religious beliefs, or her views about the
birthing process. Routine obstetrical decisions, while they often in
volve trading off some increased degree of fetal safety for maternal
comfort, seldom involve extreme threats to the fetus that involve value
judgments about the possible quality of its life. Judgments in crisis
situations, however, do. Although in the two specific examples dis
cussed under the "only hope" strategy the baby died anyway, acts of
last-ditch intervention often mean the difference between life and
death. But often the life that is saved is not a normal life. These cases,
therefore, involve a value judgment directed solely at the fetus: does
26.

Cibils, supra note 12, at 478.
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the woman want her child to survive at all costs, or would she con
sider some types of existence as either worse than death, or at any rate,
a burden she does not wish to accept? Like the woman in our first
example, who initially said no to a Cesarean because she did not want
a retarded child, some women may rank severe disability in a child as
worse than death. These women would choose not to intervene ag
gressively if the situation was extremely grave.
Conflicts can arise, of course, if the doctor treating the patient
ranks death worse than disability, or worse than this infant's projected
disability. However, conflicts can arise even if the doctor and the wo
man share similar values. A number of factors appear to influence
doctors to act as if they ranked death as necessarily the worst out
come. For example, quite understandably, they are influenced by the
almost inevitable uncertainty in these cases: there is usually some
chance, albeit slim, that the baby will be fine, or at least do better than
expected, and it is very hard not to intervene when this possibility still
exists. As in cases of terminal illness, allowing the death of a patient
may feel to the doctor like giving up, and in obstetrics, it may feel like
giving up unnecessarily. They are likewise influenced to intervene by
the presence of technology: it is difficult not to use technology when it
is there, especially given medical training and socialization in favor of
intervention. The legal system magnifies the force of this imperative:
if the infant is impaired and the doctor has just stood by, the doctor
may face legal liability, whereas if he has done a Cesarean, the doctor
has the strong defense of having done everything. 27
An additional legal factor is beginning to make itself felt, in the
wake of the now infamous "Baby Doe" case, where parents of a baby
born with Down's Syndrome and a correctable esophageal defect re
fused consent to esophageal surgery. When the state courts refused to
intervene, the Department of Health and Human Services promul
gated regulations designed to prohibit withholding of treatment from
handicapped newboms. 28 The principle underlying the regulations
27. See Marieskind, Cesarean Section, 7 WOMEN & HEALTH 179, 188 (1982) (fear of
legal liability often plays role in decision to deliver by Cesarean).
28. The Department initially "reminded" health care providers receiving federal fi
nancial assistance that newborns with handicaps were protected by § 504 of the Rehabilita
tion Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982), which prohibits discrimination against the
handicapped by any program or provider receiving federal financial assistance. 47 Fed.
Reg. 26,027 (1982). This notice was followed, a year later, by an "Interim Final Rule"
which not only prohibited such "discrimination" but required each hospital to post a sign
in the newborn nursery stating that it is unlawful to fail to provide food or treatment to
handicapped newborns and advising of the availability of a "hotline" to report violations.
48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983). After this regulation was invalidated on the grounds that the
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that it is discriminatory to withhold beneficial treatment from a handi
capped infant if such treatment would be provided to a normal one
appeared to apply not only to handicaps such as Down's Syndrome,
but to far more devastating ones, which dramatically shortened life
and/or resulted in profound physical and mental deficits.29 The regu
lations were invalidated on a number of grounds by a series of federal
courts,30 culminating with the Supreme Court decision in Bowen v.
American Hospital Association,31 which emphasized that hospitals
have no duty, and indeed, no right, to treat infants without parental
consent. The Court found that the Department presented insufficient
evidence of hospitals failing to report parental refusals of treatment for
handicapped newborns to warrant the regulations. 32 Thus far, the end
Department had failed to follow the notice and comment procedures required by the Ad
ministrative Procedure Act, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395,
404 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the Department then followed proper procedures, issuing a Final
Rule, 49 Fed. Reg. 1621 (1984), which modified the requirements for posting of signs, and
used slightly more moderate language. The rule still provided that it was discrimination to
fail to treat any newborn who could benefit from treatment, no matter how severe the
degree of handicap.
29. For critiques of the application of the principle of nondiscrimination in the new
born nursery, see, e.g., Arras, Ethical Principles for the Care of Imperiled Newborns: To
ward an Ethic of Ambiguity, in WHICH BABIES SHALL LIVE: HUMANISTIC DIMENSIONS
OF THE CARE OF IMPERILED NEWBORNS 83, 100-05 (T. Murray & A. Caplan, eds. 1985)
(analyzing various interpretations of "discrimination" in the context of treatment deci
sions); Rhoden, Treatment Dilemmas for Imperiled Newborns: Why Quality ofLife Counts,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1298-1302 (1985); Rhoden & Arras, Withholding Treatmentfrom
Baby Doe: From Discrimination to Child Abuse, 63 MILBANK MEM. FUND. Q. 18, 24-29
(1985).
30. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 161 (2d Cir. 1984) (invalidating
regulations on primary ground that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was never intended to
apply to complex treatment decisions in the newborn nursery), aff'g 575 F. Supp. 607, 614
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying government access to records of "Baby Jane Doe," an infant
with spina bifid a upon whom surgery had not been performed, on the grounds that the
hospital had not violated the Rehabilitation Act).
31. 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986). Lower court decisions in the American Hospital litigation
had been expressly based upon the Second Circuit's holding in University Hosp., 729 F.2d
144. See, American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D. N.Y. 1984), aff'd Nos.
84-6211 and 84-6231 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 1984).
32. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2114-20. It is true, and quite important, that hospitals can
not treat a baby without parental consent. However, the Supreme Court majority's empha
sis on the theory that hospitals cannot violate Section 504 by withholding treatment when
parents have refused consent distorts the way that treatment decisions are made in hospi
tals. As the dissent notes, parental decisions do not occur in a vacuum, but are made in
conjunction with physicians. Physicians may treat handicapped newborns differently from
non-handicapped ones by encouraging, or not discouraging, parental inclinations to with
hold treatment. Id. at 2128, (White, J., dissenting). As for the majority holding that there
is no evidence that hospitals discriminatorily fail to report non-treatment decisions for
handicapped newborns, anyone who has talked with physicians about these issues knows
that, as the dissent puts it: "It is ... obvious that whoever is making them, decisions to
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result of the public attention given to the dilemma of treatment of
imperiled newborns is the invalidation of the very rigid Baby Doe reg
ulations. In the interim, however, Congress passed the 1984 Amend
ments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act 33 which
mandate treatment unless the infant is dying, permanently comatose,
or the treatment is futile or virtually futile and under the circum
stances inhumane. 34 Although these Amendments are more flexible
than the former Baby Doe regulations, they still indicate a strong in
tent to decrease parental and physician discretion and require aggres
sive treatment if the infant will have even a very minimal level of
consciousness.
Given these various developments, it is not at all surprising that
even though many physicians may believe that withholding or termi
nating treatment for seriously impaired infants is appropriate in cer
tain cases, they increasingly feel constrained to treat all infants
aggressively. Moreover, as parental discretion immediately after birth
is increasingly limited, doctors may wonder whether a woman should
be able to opt for death over disability in the moments before birth, as
well as whether the doctor might risk legal liability if he accedes to
such wishes. Thus even if doctors have values similar to those of their
obstetric patients, and even if doctors, were they personally faced with
such a situation, might forego aggressive treatment, their professional
training, fears of malpractice liability, concerns created by the "Baby
Doe" rules, etc., may come between their beliefs and actions.
My experience at hospitals suggests that a physician is relatively
unlikely to go to court to attempt to force treatment in a crisis situa
tion where the fetus' chances, even with treatment, appear seriously
compromised. For one thing, if it is a crisis situation where "last
ditch" intervention is being urged, the woman probably lacks firm reli
gious or philosophical objections to such intervention-as opposed to
a situation where a woman had informed health care personnel from
the beginning that she would oppose certain procedures. Rather, she
is just trying, like the doctors, to weigh the risks of intervention-both
the risk to her and the chance of a severely impaired child-versus the
withhold treatment from such infants are in fact being made." Id. I believe that the regu
lations warranted invalidation on a number of grounds, including excessive interference
with parental and medical discretion, the fact that the Rehabilitation Act was never in
tended to apply to such situations, and that the principle of nondiscrimination is grossly
oversimplified for these difficult decisions in the newborn nursery. My quarrel with the
majority opinion in Bowen is not about its outcome, but its misrepresentation of the medi
cal context in an attempt to rationalize the outcome.
33. 42 U.S.c. §§ 5101-5115 (Supp. III 1985).
34. 42 U.S.c. § 5102(2)(b)(3) (Supp. III 1985).
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potential benefits of saving a child who turns out to be fine, or at least
relatively normal. When the physician is offering even a slim chance
of saving the infant, it is likely that the combination of uncertainty,
guilt, hope, and desperation will influence the woman ultimately to
follow the physician's suggestion. And, in the rare case where desper
ate or reluctant consent is not forthcoming, doctors would be rela
tively unlikely to seek a court order, both because of the time
constraints and because they are less likely to challenge the woman's
decision if they believe that even with treatment, the infant is likely to
die or be severely impaired. If, however, doctors believe that with the
treatment the child can be fine, they are increasingly apt to challenge
the woman's decision in court.
Most such suits so far have involved women's refusals to submit
to Cesareans needed for the fetus', and sometimes their own, health.
In the two cases reported in the legal or medical literature, the courts
have granted the order,35 and this has similarly been true in most of
the additional unreported cases of which I am aware. 36 These cases
are still, at present, few and far between, and they have involved, for
the most part, women with unusual religious beliefs about medical in
tervention. But they have an import beyond their numbers. These
cases raise the ultimate issue in obstetrics of whether women can
choose a course of action that reflects their own beliefs and concerns,
but that puts the fetus at risk. This issue is not limited to Cesarean
versus vaginal delivery: courts have ordered blood transfusions for
pregnant Jehovah's Witnesses, both before and after fetal viability,37
and a court has ordered insulin treatment for a pregnant diabetic who
refused it on religious grounds. 38 These judicial interventions into wo
35. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d
457 (1981); Bowes & SeJgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights: Medical and Legal Perspec
tives, 58 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 209, 211-12 (1981).
36. See, e.g., In re Baby Jeffries, No. 14004 (Probate Ct., Jackson Cy, Mich., May
24, 1982) (order authorizing surgery); North Central Bronx Hosp. v. Headley, No. 1992/85
(S. Ct., Special Term, Bronx Cy, N.Y., Jan. 6, 1986) (order authorizing surgery). Some
cases arise and are decided so quickly that no written order is issued. Interview with Judge
Margaret Taylor, Family Court, in New York City (Nov. 6, 1985) (describing 1982 case
where attorneys for St. Vincent's Hospital sought an order but she refused to issue one).
37. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d
537 (1964). This case was decided long before Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and is
thus of somewhat questionable precedential value. A much more recent case is In re Ja
maica Hosp., N.Y.L.J., May 17, 1985, at 15 (Queens Cy., S. Ct., Special Term, Part 2)
(fetus was 18 weeks in gestation).
38. In re Unborn Baby Wilson, cited in In re Baby Jeffries, No. 14004 (Probate Ct.,
Jackson Cy., Mich., May 24, 1982) slip op. at 7. Hospital personnel are increasingly begin
ning to contemplate numerous potential involuntary treatments. I have participated in
ethics rounds at several hospitals where the issue was whether a pregnant patient whose
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men's choices are in striking contrast to the trend in other areas of
medicine, which is to accept patients' rights to refuse medical treat
ment of any kind. In obstetrics, however, doctors and others in society
are increasingly questioning whether women have the right to take
actions or refuse therapies which might imperil the healthy fetus. 39
Thus far, doctors have sought judicial intervention only when
they believed that without treatment the fetus would die or be dam
aged, but with treatment would probably be fine. But if overriding
women's choices becomes established judicial fare, doctors may begin
seeking judicial intervention, or threaten to seek it, in cases where the
infant might be compromised even with maximal treatment. This
would, after all, make sense, if the thrust of the Child Abuse Amend
ments-that handicapped newborns have the same rights to treatment
as non-handicapped ones-is considered to apply in utero as well.
The potential for reallocation of decisionmaking authority in ob
stetrics does not stop here, either. Although cases thus far have in
volved maternal actions that have created grave risks for their fetuses,
many women take actions that physicians consider less than optimal
during pregnancy. For example, many women refuse electronic fetal
monitoring, or even choose to give birth at home. Whether or not the
long arm of the law ever reaches women who have fled the hospital,40
when the woman is in the hospital it is not too far-fetched to imagine
that doctors may challenge refusals of procedures such as fetal moni
toring. 41 Concern for the fetus, as well as concern about malpractice
liability, has inspired hospital risk managers, legal counsel and counsel
for New York City public hospitals sometimes to advise doctors just to
do whatever is best for the fetus, notwithstanding maternal refusa1. 42
conduct was harmful to the fetus in some way could be forcibly hospitalized and/or
treated.
39. In a recent article, the author describes a situation where a woman was seven
months pregnant and at a cocktail party, when "a stranger walked over and wordlessly
removed a glass of white wine from her hand." The author also reports being pregnant
herself and having dinner at a Chinese restaurant when a woman she didn't know stopped
at her table tapped her plate, and said, "Uh, uh, uh, MSG." Quindlen, The New Rules for
Pregnancy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1986, Part II (Magazine) at 82,86. The author refers to
these intervenors as the "fetus police." Id.
40. In one court-ordered Cesarean case, the order authorized police to seek out the
pregnant woman and forcibly return her to the hospital. In re Baby Jeffries, No. 14004
(Probate Ct., Jackson Cy., Mich., May 24, 1982) slip op. at 9.
41. The order in another case appointed the chief of obstetrics as guardian ad litem
for the fetus, with authority to consent to necessary diagnostic or therapeutic procedures if
the woman came to the hospital. North Central Bronx Hosp. v. Headley, No. 1992/85 (S.
Ct., Special Term, Bronx Cy., N.Y., Jan. 6, 1986) slip op. at 2.
42. Interview with Salvatore Russo, Associate Counsel, N.Y.C. Health & Hospitals
Corp., in New York City (Jan. 10, 1985) (stating opinion that city hospital should be able
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Even though this advice reflects fears of financial responsibility, it con
stitutes an assumption of medical responsibility for fetal outcome and
obstetrical decisionmaking. Thus along with the existing potential
value conflicts is emerging a conflict on a higher level: to what extent
should pregnant women have the authority and responsibility for mak
ing the sorts of medical decisions that, under the informed consent
doctrine, patients ordinarily, or at least theoretically, make?

III.

CAN ANYTHING BE DONE?

Professor Katz's central thesis, of course, is that truly shared
decisionmaking in medicine requires that physicians reflect upon and
discuss among themselves the underlying influences on their decisions,
including psychological motives, professional values and socialization,
and that they enter into an open-ended dialogue with patients in which
they share their uncertainties. By listening to patients, physicians may
be at least partially able to overcome what Katz calls one of the most
pernicious problems in medicine: "that in their professional interac
tions with patients, physicians view themselves as too rational and
their patients as too irrational" (p. 150). If physicians take the time to
analyze their own unconscious motivations and to realize how their
non-medical values seep into judgments they had heretofore conceptu
alized as purely, or at least largely, medical, they will achieve an en
hanced regard for the differing values that could underlie patients'
inclinations to act differently.
Obstetrical decisionmaking would undoubtedly be improved if
physicians were, for some reason, inspired to take Professor Katz's
suggestions seriously and to seek to implement them. Obstetricians
are, of course, aware that diagnostic technologies in obstetrics have
their limitations, and that they may therefore "diagnose" problems
that do not in fact exist. But many obstetricians are not fully aware
that they are trained to react to uncertainty in a particular manner:
they may believe that their response is the only possible response or,
because uncertainty makes them so uncomfortable, may fail to take it
fully into account. Doctors feel an understandable discomfort in ad
mitting, and especially in revealing to patients, the fact that the ma
chines upon which they are so dependent are far from infallible. But
to perform procedures necessary for fetus' health, despite maternal refusal, and that ob
taining court order helpful but not necessary); Interview with Patty Lipschitz, Counsel,
North Central Bronx Hospital, in New York City (Jan. 13, 1985) (confirming that the
Health and Hospital Corporation does not think court orders necessary, but expressing
disapproval of this stance).
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doctors clearly need to tell patients, preferably early in the course of
pregnancy and long before a crisis could arise, of the limitations of
diagnostic technologies and of the possibility that they will need to act
under conditions of uncertainty.
Providing information about technological limitations and the
possibility of unclear diagnoses or prognoses is not enough, however.
Physicians must come to understand both why they react to diagnostic
and prognostic uncertainty the way they do and why a patient might
react differently. In other words, they need to go the very difficult
extra step of recognizing that there are sometimes legitimate alterna
tives to the approaches that have come to seem so natural and so right.
Such awareness is difficult to attain. 43 Awareness of alternative ap
proaches to decisionmaking under uncertainty comes at a cost: in a
field where quick, decisive action is so often needed, it is difficult to be
quick and decisive when one's certainty is diminishing ..
This, however, is the point at which shared decisionmaking is
helpful. A doctor who unequivocally is not sure of the "right" way to
proceed is far more likely to make the choice in conjunction with the
patient, taking her values into account. In obstetrics, because there
are situations that indeed require quick, decisive action, exploration of
the woman's values should ideally take place long before pressured or
emergency decisionmaking is necessary. Because in an emergency
there is so little time for exploration of the values of doctor and pa
tient, it is crucial that whenever possible, such conversations be held in
advance of any emergency. If the doctor has taken the time to discuss
the sorts of dilemmas that may arise, even though such discussions
may be disturbing and frightening, the physician will then have a
much better sense of the woman's own concerns and values, and con
versations during a crisis will be more profitable.
Few women will come for prenatal care with a rigidly established
set of priorities to be applied to a situation in which their health inter
ests and those of the fetus might conflict. Some observers have sug
gested a broad spectrum of possibilities in discussing innovative fetal
surgery-from the woman placing her health and welfare first and
foremost, to subsuming her interests to those of the fetus, to seeking a
reasonable center ground. 44 Moreover, with any set of preferences,
43. At the two hospitals affiliated with Albert Einstein College of Medicine at which
Dr. Fleischman and I led Perinatal Law and Ethics Rounds, lengthy and sustained discus
sion regarding the medical uncertainties involved seemed to help physicians feel more com
fortable with, and less responsible for, uncertainty.
44. Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 24, at 12-13. Ruddick and Wilcox suggest three
possible therapeutic contracts between woman and physician: (1) gynecological-the wo
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women will differ in whether they would rather risk fetal death-often
by refraining from intervention-or neurological disability-some
times by intervention when the diagnosis is ominous.
Obviously, if the woman's preferences, values and inclinations to
ward particular approaches to uncertainty differ radically from the
physician's, serious problems will arise. Because of the potential conse
quences to the fetus, obstetricians find it particularly hard to defer to
patient's wishes. Serious conflicts unearthed early in pregnancy may
warrant a change in physician. But public patients, or ones who come
in later in pregnancy, may not have this lUxury. In these cases, physi
cians face the difficult task of learning to respect and honor the wo
man's choices even when they differ somewhat from their own, and in
the course of doing so, treating her not simply as a patient, but as an
equal partner in the obstetrical undertaking. They must see value con
flicts not as a threat to their authority, but as a challenge-how to
provide the best care possible that is nonetheless consistent with the
woman's values.
Of course, these suggestions do not answer the question that is
unique to obstetrics: how to proceed in cases of irreconcilable conflict,
when honoring the woman's choice almost surely will endanger the
fetus. Professor Katz astutely notes the extent to which judges are
inclined to distrust patients and uphold medical authority (p. 59).
This inclination often will prevail in obstetric conflicts, especially
given the dreadful and irrevocable consequences of upholding, for ex
ample, a woman's refusal of a Cesarean which is needed for the fetus'
life or health. A judge's tendency to grant the doctors' request, illus
trated in almost all the cases thus far, may be reinforced by the fact
that the women in these cases are seldom represented by counsel. But
even though they can probably succeed, individual obstetricians and
the obstetrical profession in general, need to seriously consider the
prior question of whether, in the long run, it is wise to ask courts to
replace informed consent with enforced acquiescence.
One potential drawback of seeking judicial intervention to over
ride treatment refusals of pregnant women relates to the informed con
sent doctrine itself. When a woman comes in for prenatal care and
indicates that she has unusual religious or medical beliefs that would
cause her to oppose surgical intervention, doctors should have an obli
gation to tell her that if a crisis arises, they will not honor these beliefs.
man's health coming first, with pregnancy as a complication of her gynecological condition;
(2) pediatric-the fetus treated as if it were a child, with its needs and interest paramount
to those of the woman's; and (3) obstetric-some middle ground between (1) and (2). Id.
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Her response may be to find another doctor, a response that is proba
bly agreeable to all concerned. But if she is a public patient, she may
have no alternative, and may end up foregoing prenatal care. Signifi
cantly, in several cases where a court order has been obtained, the
woman did not return to the hospital and in one case a very high risk
woman had a home birth.45 If this occurs with any frequency, the
doctors' fetal protection policy will backfire, putting the fetus at even
greater risk than would a hospital birth where surgery is refused.
Even if the woman bows to this powerful combination of obstetri
cal and judicial authority, however, the obstetrical physician-patient
relationship may suffer more subtle erosion as a result of this realloca
tion of power. The possibility of involuntary commitment looms over
certain psychiatrist-patient encounters and may make those en
counters far more problematic than when such a threat is absent. Pa
tients, whether psychiatric or obstetric, who know that their doctors
can forcibly treat them in a way they abhor may view those doctors
differently from patients who unambivalently believe their doctors are
there to help them. Even though in individual cases the consequences
of abiding by a maternal refusal will be tragic, the consequences of
patients losing their right to choose and seeing their obstetricians as
adversaries may be ultimately. at least as disturbing. Moreover, as
doctors assimilate their newfound power to direct women to "follow
doctor's orders," and increasingly view themselves in the role of fetal
protectors or advocates, these doctors will lose whatever incentive
they now have to share decisionmaking in any meaningful way.
CONCLUSION

In summary, there is reason to be profoundly pessimistic about
the chances for shared decisionmaking in obstetrics. The intense anal
ysis and ongoing dialogue for which Professor Katz pleads could un
doubtedly do much to improve the situation.. But already lurking
beneath the obstetrical dialogue are unchallenged and sometimes
problematic decision strategies compounded by technological limita
tions, the "technological imperative," the looming threat of malprac
45. This occurred in North Central Bronx Hosp. v. Headley, No. 1992/85 (S. Ct.,
Special Term, Bronx Cy., N.Y., Jan. 6, 1986); Shulman interview, supra note 19. An indi
cation of the uncertainty inherent in medical predictions and the possibly alarmist nature of
certain predictions is that this woman had a vaginal birth in which she and the baby were
fine, id., as did the woman in In re Baby Jeffries, No. 14004 (Probate Ct., Jackson Cy.,
Mich., May 24, 1982). Mrs. Jefferson, in Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp.
Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981), likewise gave birth vaginally. See Annas, Forced
Cesareans: The Most Unkindest Cut of All, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1982, at 16.
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tice liability, and numerous but often unexplored value judgments and
potential conflicts. Already, the woman is in an extraordinarily vul
nerable position, given her concern and anxiety for her baby's welfare.
If we add to all this doctors' emerging ability to override treatment
refusals they view as risky or unwise, Professor Katz's vision of shared
decisionmaking fades into the realm of imaginary obstetrical en
counters. Except when the doctor's recommendation is really op
tional, the woman's choices may soon be reduced to gracefully
submitting to the medical recommendation, resulting in the appear
ance of informed consent. If she is compelled to submit, there is not
eyen this comforting fiction. Hence, in obstetrics, informed consent
niay soon pass from being a necessary illusion to an illusion that is not
necessary at all.

